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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. The Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the Industrial Commission Order that Defendant Russell G.
Griffith, dba Teton Physical Therapy, P.A. was not a category 1 statutory employer and that
Claimant's employment with Defendant Russell G. Griffeth, dba Teton Physical Therapy, P.A is
casual employment.

B. The Course of Proceedings
A Worker's Compensation Complaint was filed by the Claimant, Geff Stringer, prose,
against William Bryan Robinson, dba Highmark Construction, on October 5, 2009. Defendant,
William Bryan Robinson, dba Highmark Construction filed an answer on or about November 3,
2009. Claimant, Geff Stringer, filed a Complaint against Russell G. Griffith, dba Teton Physical
Therapy, P.A. on May 12, 2010 and an Amended Complaint against Highmark Construction and
Russell G. Griffith, dba Teton Physical Therapy, P.A on May 21, 2010 and May 24, 2010.
Russell G. Griffith, dba Teton Physical Therapy, P.A filed an Answer on May 26, 2010. The
cases were subsequently consolidated. A Hearing was held on September 12, 2011 before
Referee Alan Taylor. The Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order was filed on May 24, 2012. A Notice of Appeal was filed on June 25, 2012.
C. Statement of Facts
1. Claimant's Testimony

On August 19, 2009, Claimant saw an advertisement on Craigslist for a qualified
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carpenter who could work without supervision. That evening, Claimant left a message for
William Bryan Robinson (hereinafter "Robinson"). On August 20, 2009, Robinson retuned the
Claimant's call and it was agreed that they would meet at Robinson's mother-in-law's house.
During the meeting, Robinson indicated that he needed someone with experience who could do
trim work at an addition at Teton Physical Therapy without supervision. After a discussion
regarding pay, it was agreed that Claimant would do the trim work at Teton Physical Therapy
and be paid $13 .50 per hour. Claimant testified that at that first meeting with Robinson, there
was no discussion regarding tax withholding. (Tr. p. 28, 1. 5 through p. 31, 1. 18)
Claimant testified that he began work on Friday, August 21, 2000. He met Robinson at
Teton Physical Therapy and the two of them took Robinson's trailer to his home to pick up more
tools. They then drove to a job site at a residence in Ririe (later changed to Shelley) where
Robinson had to check on a job. Claimant testified that they took some measurements but did
not work there. Following that, they returned to Teton Physical Therapy and Robinson reviewed
with Claimant what he wanted done and the two of them started working. At the end of the day,
Robinson paid Claimant for working that day by way of a personal check (Tr. p. 31, 1. 19 through
p. 35, 1. 9)
On Monday, August 24, 2000, Robinson instructed Claimant and the others to work on a
job site in Shelley where they worked for two hours. They then returned to Teton Physical
Therapy where Claimant resumed installation of the trim on the addition. Claimant testified that
Robinson was there and showed Claimant what he wanted done. Claimant testified that he did
not recall what time Robinson left that day as Robinson was in and out throughout the whole job.
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Claimant worked a total of 9.5 hours that day. (Tr. p. 37, 1. 1though1. 13) (Tr. p. 40, 1. 1 through
L 15) (Tr. p. 62, I. 25 through p. 63, 1. 20)
On Tuesday, August 25, 2000, Claimant arrived at Teton Physical Therapy and continued
working on the trim. Claimant testified that on either August 24, 2000, or August 25, 2000,
Russell Griffeth (hereinafter "Griffeth") came out of the existing building to where Claimant was
working and told Claimant that he did not like how Claimant was installing the trim because he
could see gaps between the wall and the trim. Claimant did not feel comfortable discussing how
he was doing his job with Griffeth because he believed Robinson was his boss. (Tr. p. 37, 1. 16
through p. 38, 1. 25) (Tr. p. 40, 1. 16through1. 19)
On Wednesday, August 26, 2009, and Thursday, August 27, 2009, Claimant continued
installing trim. Also, on August 27, 2009, Claimant began working in the ceiling and attic of the
addition in preparation of the placement of beams. Claimant testified that Robinson and Griffeth
told him he was to keep track of his time separate for the work done on the trim versus the work
done on the attic and ceiling. (Tr. p. 39, 1. 19 through p. 42, 1. 15)
On Friday, August 28, 2000, Robinson instructed Claimant to go to a house in Shelley
and replace a door and several windows. Robinson arrived at the house in Shelley as Claimant
and two other individuals hired by Robinson, Roberto, and Mario, completed the assigned work.
Roberto told Claimant that he had worked for Robinson for three years. Mario started working
for Robinson the week before Claimant began working on the addition. Claimant then returned
to Teton Physical Therapy and continued working on the trim. Claimant did not work on August
29 or 30, 2009. (Tr. p. 42, I. 16 top. 43, 1. 23)
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On Monday, August 31, 2009, Claimant worked at Teton Physical Therapy on the trim
and assisted with the beams. On Tuesday, September 1, 2000, Claimant worked at Teton
Physical Therapy on the trim installing a chair rail and placing rafters in the attic. Pursuant to
the instructions of Robinson and Griffeth, Claimant kept track of his hours working in each area
separately. On Wednesday, September 2, 2000, Claimant worked at Teton Physical Therapy for
1.5 hours in the attic removing insulation and three hours on framing a door. It was Claimant's
understanding that he was being paid the same rate for work he did in the ceiling as he was
working on the trim. On Thursday, September 3, 2000, Claimant worked 3 .5 hours finishing the
trim on the addition. (Tr. p. 43, 1. 24 through p. 46, 1. 15)
On Friday, September 4, 2009, Claimant ru.-rived at Teton Physical Therapy at 4:30 p.m.
so that they could start working on the connection between the addition and the existing building
after the clients/patients had left. Present to do the ceiling work was Claimant, Robinson,
Griffeth, Roberto, Mario, and some of the physical therapy staff. It is Claimant's recollection
that Robinson cut the beams to length while the others set up stages on the floor. Then,
Robinson, Griffeth, Claimant, Roberto and the physical therapy staff lifted a 14-foot beam up
into the attic area and then everyone that was in the attic except Robinson, Roberto and Claimant
went back down to the floor. Robinson was then positioned at the center of the beam with
Roberto at the top and Claimant at the bottom as they were attempting to lift the beam high
enough to attach it to a chain hoist which was attached to one of the rafters of the roof. Before
they could get the beam attached to the chain hoist, the ceiling collapsed and the three of them
and the beam fell to the ground. The beam landed on Claimant's left lower extremity and he
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suffered a broken ankle. (Tr. p. 50. L. 16 to p. 54, I. 18)
Claimant testified that while he was lying on the floor after the accident, Griffeth asked
Robinson if his workers' compensation insurance was in force and Robinson replied that he was
not sure. Following that, Robinson, Griffeth and the electrician helped Claimant to Griffeth's
truck and Griffeth drove Claimant to the hospital. (Tr. p. 56, 1. 5 to 1. 22)

2. Griffeth's Testimony
Griffeth is the owner of Teton Physical Therapy, which is an S Corporation. Griffeth
owns half of the premises of2037 East 1ih Street, Idaho Falls, Idaho, with Dr. John Andary.
Griffeth testified that in early 2009, he decided to do an addition to his portion of the above
described premises. He contracted an architect, Rulon Nielson, who did the plans for the
addition. (Tr. p. 122, 1. 2, through p. 126, I. 1)
Griffeth testified that he got bids from several contractors, including Robinson.
Robinson's bid was a little less formal as he had helped Griffeth on his home, not as a contractor,
but just a helper. Griffeth testified that if he could have he would have been his own contractor,
but that the City ofidaho Falls would not allow him to do so. He asked Robinson to get a
contractor's license so Griffeth could do the addition. There was no written contract between
Robinson and Griffeth. (Tr. p. 134, 1. 10 through p. 141, 1. 14)
Griffeth testified that he hired some of the sub-contractors and Robinson hired other subcontractors, but that the bills were sent directly to him. In addition, he testified that Robinson
was bidding some of the work himself, such as the trim work. (Tr. p. 134, 1. 10 through p. 141, 1.
50)

5

Griffeth testified that he first met Claimant when he was doing the trim work and that he
understood Claimant was to be working for Robinson. He further testified that he would look at
the trim work every day to be sure it was being done as he wanted, but that he was not telling
Claimant how to do it, only how he wanted it to look. When questioned whether he talked to
Claimant regarding keeping his hours separate from the attic and trim work, he agreed that he
might have. (Tr. p. 144, 1. 19 through p. 148, 1. 8)
Griffeth was questioned regarding whether he had paid any money to Robinson the night
of September 4, 2009, and he had no recollection of doing so. He did testify that on occasion he
would pay Mario and Roberto directly when Robinson asked him to do so. He estimated that he
had done this on four or five occasions. (Tr. p. 155, 1. 16 through p. 157, 1. 25)
Griffeth testified that he did not recall specifically that he asked Claimant to work on the
ceiling as he thought he was part of Robinson's crew. However, he did admit that he asked if
Claimant would be there on September 4, 2000, and over the weekend, in order to get the job
done. {Tr. p. 158, I. 10 through p. 158, 1. 2)

3. Robinson's Testimony
Robinson testified that the last time he did any construction work was in September of
2009, when he finished the Teton Physical Therapy addition. He testified that he first contacted
Griffeth in February of 2009 as he had heard a rumor the Griffeth was going to build an addition
onto Teton Physical Therapy. Griffeth testified that in March of 2009, Griffeth and Robinson
went over the blueprints to come up with a price range for the project. Robinson testified that he
had contacted Griffeth because he wanted to do the framing on the addition. He further testified
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that Griffeth wanted to be his own contractor but the City ofldaho Falls would not let the owner
of a commercial building be the contractor. (Tr. p. 178, 1. 7 through p. 186, 1. 19)
Robinson testified that at that time he was a licensed residential contractor but did not
have a commercial contractor's license. Robinson went to Utah to take the required test to obtain
his commercial license and that he considered himself to be a "contractor." Robinson testified
that pursuant to the terms of the contract he entered into with Griffeth, Robinson would assist
Griffeth during construction of the addition when he was available as Robinson would be
working on another project for a period of 5 to 6 weeks during that time. (Tr. p. 190, 1. 21
through p. 191, I. 11)
Robinson testified that Griffeth hired most of the subcontractors himself. He also
testified at times that he would not see any of the subcontractors as he was not on the project all
of the time. He testified that he was gone almost the whole month of July and into August as he
was working on a remodel of his mother-in-law's house. He further testified that he did not
supervise any of the subcontractors. (Tr. p. 196, 1. 6 through p. 200, 1. 17)
Robinson testified that Griffeth had changed the plans for the addition by vaulting the
ceiling which would require more help than originally planned. Robinson placed an ad on
Craigslist looking for a skilled carpenter who could do trim and beam work. At the time
Robinson hired Claimant, he had just tom the roof off of his mother-in-law's house and needed
additional help to do the trim work at Teton Physical Therapy. (Tr. p. 201, 1. 11 through p. 206, 1.
21)
Robinson met Claimant on Friday, August 21, 2000, and stated that they first went to
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Shelley, (not Ririe), and took some measurements and then picked up tools to be used at Teton
Physical Therapy. Robinson paid Claimant on August 21, 2000, with a personal check as he did
not have a business account. Robinson testified that at times he did not have enough cash flow
to pay Claimant, Roberto or Mario without submitting a bill to Griffeth who would pay Robinson
within a day or two so that he could pay the workers. In fact, on August 21, 2000, he had gotten
a draw from Griffeth which he used to pay Claimant. (Tr. p. 207, 1. 13, through p. 211, 1. 12)
On Monday, August 24, 2000, Claimant started working at Teton Physical Therapy and
Robinson testified that he watched him work for a while to be sure he knew what he was doing.
Robinson testified that he did not work that much with Claimant during the week of August 24,
2000, because he was working on the roof of his mother-in-law's house. (Tr. 208, 1. 16, through
p. 212, 1. 10)
Robinson testified that when he hired Claimant, Robinson told him that he needed him
for both trim work and beam work. At a later time, Robinson told Claimant that he had to keep
his time working on the trim and beams separate as Robinson had a bid on the trim but not on the
beam work. Robinson explained that Claimant's Exhibit 22, p. 32, was a bill submitted to
Griffeth that included 29 hours of Claimant working on the ceiling. Robinson testified that he
went to the bank and got cash to pay Roberto, Mario, and Claimant. It is interesting that the bill
also shows Robinson working 17 hours during that time period in the attic which was separate
from the trim work. (Tr. p. 213, 1. 4 through p. 217, 1. 6)
Robinson admitted that he did not have workers' compensation insurance and that
Griffeth had not inquired about workers' compensation insurance until after the accident. He
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also stated that at times Griffeth paid Roberto and Mario directly because Robinson did not have
time to type up an invoice and Roberto and Mario needed to be paid. (Tr. p. 217, 1. 7 through p.
219,1.24)
On Monday night, September 4, 2009, everyone was working to get the beams up so the
building would be usable on Tuesday. At the time of the accident, Claimant, Robinson and
Roberto were in the attic when the roof caved in and Claimant fell and fractured his ankle. (Tr. p.
221, 1. 13, top. 226, 1. 6)
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Whether the Defendant, Russell G. Griffeth, dba Teton Physical Therapy, P.A., was a

category 1 statutory employer of Claimant.
2. Whether Claimant's employment relationship with Defendant, Russell G. Griffeth,
dba Teton Physical Therapy, P.A. was casual employment.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
When the Court reviews a decision from the Industrial Commission, it exercises free
review over questions of law but reviews questions of fact only to determine whether substantial
and competent evidence supports the Commission's findings. "Spencer v. Allpress Logging, Inc.,
134 Idaho 857, 859, 11P.3d475, 478 (2000) (citing Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910
P.2d 759, 760 (1996)). "Whether the Commission correctly applied the law to the facts is an
issue of law over which we exercise free review." Konvalinka v. Bonneville County, 140 Idaho
477, 478, 95 PJd 628, 629 (2004) (citing Combes vs. State, Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 130
Idaho 430, 942 P.2d 554 (1997)).
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ARGUMENT
The Industrial Commission found as follows:
1. That Claimant was not an independent contractor in his relationship with Robinson.
Claimant agrees.
2. That Claimant was an employee of Robinson. That Claimant was not an employee of
Griffeth. Claimant agrees.
3. That Griffeth is not a statutory 2 employer. Claimant agrees.
4. The Industrial Commission concluded that while Griffeth initially qualified as a
category 1 statutory employer, he was not liable as a statutory employer because Claimant's
employment was casual with Griffeth. Claimant disagrees. Griffeth is a category 1 statutory
employer and Claimant's employment with Griffeth was not casual.
1. Statutory Employer

This Court has continuously stated that the statutory definition of employer is an
expanded definition designed to prevent an employer from avoiding liability under the workers'
compensation statutes by subcontracting the work to others who may be irresponsible and not
insure their employees. Runcorn v. Shearer Lumber Prod., Inc., 107 Idaho 389, 392-93, 690
P.2d 324, 327-28 (1984) (citing Adam v. Titan Equip. Supply Corp., 93 Idaho 644, 646, 470
P.2d 409, 411 (1970))
This Court, in Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 76 P.3d 951 (2003),
interpreted Idaho Code Section 72-223 (1) to include category 1 and category 2 statutory
employers. The Court in Kolar v. Cassia Countv Idaho, 142 Idaho 347, 127 P.3d 962 (2005)
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stated as follows regarding the two categories of employers:
"As noted above, LC. § 72-223(1) identifies two categories of
employers who are not third parties: (1) "those employers
described in Section 72-216, Idaho Code, having under them
contractors or subcontractors who have in fact complied with the
provisions of Section 72-301, Idaho Code" (which will be referred
to herein as a category one employer); and (2) "the owner or lessee
of premises, or other person which is virtually the proprietor or
operator of the business there carried on, but who, by reason of
there being an independent contractor or for any other reason, is
not the direct employer of the workmen there employed" (a
category two employer). Thus, if the respondent meets either of
these categories, they were Mr. Kolar's statutory employers and
cannot be sued.". 142 Idaho at 352
In Kolar, the appellant was employed by an engineering firm that had contracted with
Burley Highway District to do engineering services to improve a road in Cassia County. Cassia
County had entered into an agreement with Albion Highway District and Burley Highway
District to provide funds to maintain that road. The parties all agreed to be jointly and severally
liable for damages to persons or property occurring in the course of maintaining the road. While
working on the construction site, Kolar was run over by a dump truck driven by an employee of
Burley Highway District. Kolar sued Defendants for negligence. Defendants responded that they
were immune from suit pursuant to Idaho Code §72-223 in that they were statutory employers of
Kolar. The Court agreed and found that the Defendants were a category 1 statutory employers
and therefore, immune from liability.
In the case of Venters v. Sorrento Deleware. Inc., 141Idaho245, 108 P.3d 392 (2005),
this Court found that Sorrento was a category 1 statutory employer. Somento operated a cheese
factory in Nampa, Idaho, and as part of the cheese making process a large amount of wastewater
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was discharged into holding ponds. Sorrento contracted with 3-C Trucking to haul waste water
from the facility to various farms. Sorrento did not maintain trucks to enable them to transport
waste water. Stanley Venters was employed as a truck driver by 3-C trucking and while waiting
to unload his waste water at a farm, he was struck by another driver from 3-C Trucking and was
injured. Venters filed suit against Sorrento and the company who owned the farm where the
accident occurred.
Sorrento argued that it was a statutory employer and was therefore protected from the
personal injury action of Mr. Venters. The District Court granted Sorrento' s Motion for
Summary Judgment. This Court agreed and found that Sorrento was a category 1 statutory
employer. The Court stated as follows:
"As stated above, the legislature has separated two classes of
statutory employers under I. C. §§ 72-102 and 72-223: [1]
employers who make use of contractor's or subcontractor's
employees, and [2] owners, lessees of the premises, or other
persons, who are also the virtual proprietor or operator of the
business there carried on. See also Harpole v. State, 131 Idaho at
440, 958 P.2d at 597. While Sorrento probably qualifies as a
statutory employer under either test, and the district court so found,
we will focus our analysis only on the first prong.
Sorrento qualifies as a statutory employer of Mr. Venters simply
because of its contractual relationship with 3-C Trucking. As an
employer of a contractor, Sorrento would not have been permitted
to avoid liability to Mr. Venters under the Idaho worker's
compensation statutes should 3-C Trucking have failed to comply
with the worker's compensation statutes. See Spencer vs. Allpress
Logging, Inc., 134 Idaho 856, 11 P3d 475 (2000). As it happens,
here, 3-C provided worker's compensation coverage to Mr.
Venters and benefits to the Venters, obviating the need for
Sorrento's workers' compensation coverage to come into play in
this particular case. The district court correctly determined that
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Sorrento's Nampa facility as part of the day to day operations of
that facility. Therefore, Sorrento enjoys the immunities provided
by the Act from third-party tort liability.". 141 Idaho at 398

In Pierce v. School Dist. #21, 144 Idaho 537, 164 P.3d 817 (2007) Jerry Kelly, d/b/a
Top Roofing, contracted with School Dist. #21 to repair the roofs of various school buildings.
Jerry Kelly employed Joey Pierce as a roofer. While repairing a roof, Pierce fell and was
injured. Jerry Kelly did not have workers' compensation coverage. Pierce sought workers'
compensation coverage from the school district as a statutory employer. The Court affirmed the
decision of the Industrial Commission that School Dist. #21 was not a category 2 statutory
employer. It was not argued in the Industrial Commission whether School Dist. #21 was a
category 1 statutory employer. The Supreme Court therefore did not address whether School
Dist. #21 was a category 1 employer. The Court intimated though, that School Dist. #21 may
have qualified as a category 1 employee because of the contractual relationship between the
School Dist., Kelly and the Claimant.
In this matter, Griffeth entered into a contract with Robinson, a contractor, who in tum
employed Claimant. A contractual chain links Griffeth to Claimant and based upon the above
cited cases, Griffeth is a category 1 statutory employer.

2. Casual Employment
In Kolar, Venters and Pierce, the issue of casual employment was never raised. The
Industrial Commission relying on Idaho Code § 216 (1) and concluded that even though Griffeth
was a category 1 statutory employer, he did not have liability to Claimant because Claimant's
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employment was casual employment. Idaho Code § 216 (1) states as follows:
"Liability of employer to employees of contractor and
subcontractors. An employer subject to the provisions of this law
shall be liable for compensation to an employee of a contractor or
subcontractor under him who has not complied with the provisions
of section 72-301 in any case where such employer would have
been liable for compensation if such employee had been working
directly for such employer.". (Emphasis added by the Industrial
Commission)
Relying on the emphasized language, the Industrial Commission found that Griffeth
would not be liable even though he was a category 1 statutory employer because had he been
the direct employer of Claimant, Claimant's employment would have been casual.
Idaho Code §72-212(2) exempts from coverage casual employment. In Larson v.
Bonneville Pacific Service Co., 117 Idaho 988, 793 P.2d 220 (1990), Dawson v. Joe Chester
Artificial Limb Company, 62 Idaho 508, 112 P.2d 494 (1941) and Biglevv Smith, 64 Idaho 185,
129 P.2d 658 (1942), the Court has defined casual employment as employment that is
occasional, or comes at uncertain times or irregular intervals, and whose happenings cannot be
reasonably anticipated as certain, likely to occur or necessary. In some cases, the Court also
looked at the fact as to whether the employment was part of the usual trade or business of the
employer.
This Court has consistently found that it is the employment that is casual not the
employee, and that there is no hard or fast definition of casual employment and each case must
be decided largely on its' own facts. Rabideau v. Cramer, 59 Idaho 154, 81P.2d402 (1938);
Wachtlerv. Calnon, 90 Idaho 468, 413 P.2d 449 (1966)
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This definition of casual employment would apply to almost any instance where there is a
statutory employer involved. If we take the case of Pierce, the employment of Pierce by the
school district would clearly be casual employment as the employment would be occasional, or
at uncertain times or irregular intervals, and therefore could not be reasonably anticipated or
likely to occur in the future, therefore, no statutory employer.
In Kolar, the Court found that the Defendants were category 1 statutory employers. If we
follow the reasoning of the Industrial Commission, the Defendants in Kolar would not have been
shielded by Idaho Code §72-223 (1). As Kolar would have been a casual employee of the
Defendants as his employment would have been occasional, or at uncertain times or at irregular
intervals, and could not be reasonably anticipated or likely to occur in the future
Casual employment would then be used as a sword against statutory employers such as
the Defendants in the Kolar case or School Dist. #21 to wipe away their immunity for third party
claims under Idaho Code §72-223. Casual employment would then be used as in this case as a
shield to prevent Claimants from receiving the appropriate workers' compensation benefits.
That was not the intention of the legislature when they amended Idaho Code § 72-223 in 1996 to
expand statutory employers liability and protections.
The evidence is clear that both Robinson and Griffeth hired subcontractors. Robinson
has testified that he was away from the project for at least five to six weeks. If during that time
Robinson was away from the project, Griffeth had hired a plumber and an employee of the
plumber had been injured, and the plumber did not have worker's compensation insurance,
would Griffeth have been liable as a statutory employer? The answer is clearly yes, as that is the
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purpose ofidaho Code §72-216 and Idaho Code §72-223 regarding statutory employer liability.
The Industrial Commission in this matter has found Claimant's employment to be casual
in regards to Griffeth. Claimant's employment is not any different than the employment of the
plumber's employee. It is not casual employment pursuant to Idaho Code §72-216 and Idaho
Code §72-223. As stated above, there is a contractual link between Griffeth, Robinson and
Claimant. Griffeth, as a statutory employer, steps into the shoes of Robinson. Griffeth is a
category 1 statutory employer of Claimant and is responsible for the workers' compensation
benefits that may be owed to Claimant since Robinson, Claimant's employer, did not have
workers' compensation insurance.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this brief, Claimant respectfully requests that this court
reverse the Order of the Industrial Commission entered on May 24, 2012 and find that Griffeth is
a category 1 statutory employer and is responsible for the workers' compensation benefits that
may be owed to Claimant.
DATED this 'f-r\_ day ofNovember, 2012.
Petersen Parkinson & Arnold, PLLC

Dennis R. Petersen
Attorney for Claimant/Appellant
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